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Posts archive for: July, 2008
  • New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (7) The Pricing of 3G Value-added Services

    3G value-added services will be cheap, but not so cheap as you have expected.

     

    [+] The pricing of video phone service


    As a result of the fierce battle for subscribers between operators, 3G value-added services eventually become a secondary role. In the long-term, however, mobile subscribers will gradually accept the services and use them more than they did in the 2G time. In fact, subscribers first switch to 3G because of attractive voice fee rates. Then they begin to use more value-added services because of faster Internet access speed.

    Generally speaking, the most talked-about 3G services include video phone and streaming media. With video phone, you will be able to see the one you are calling. Of course, you can also dial a number to watch a live broadcasting program. Streaming media, on the other hand, enables users to watch audio/video programs via the Internet, mostly by logging onto portals of operators with handsets.

    Voice service, video phone and streaming media, how should the three services be appropriately priced? First, as video phone consumes 4 times of bandwidth than general voice calls do, should it be 4 times as expensive? The answer is no, because 4 times is pretty scaring. Most operators offer rates ranging between 1.2 to 1.5 times.

    Due to privacy and courtesy concerns, video phone is rarely used. Some people argue that operators should offer lower rates to increase use of video phone services. The fact is, however, low price is probably not sufficient to eliminate the privacy concern. Operators even believe there are reasons you have to use video phone (e.g., your wife requires you to). Is there any other chance of earning such easy money?

    [+] The pricing for streaming media

    Streaming media service, which enables mobile TV and movies, has been in a dilemma of whether to charge by traffic volume (e.g., RMB X for watching Y mega bytes per month) or by service time (e.g., RMB X for Y hours per month). Eventually, all operators chose service time-based fee rate models.

    As most users are still not accustomed to traffic based models, while charging by service time also seems weird (nobody pays TV bills by minutes), the best solution would be monthly packages without time or traffic volume limit. Fearing that users might turn on their handsets 24 hours a day, which would result in considerable waste of wireless network resources, most operators dare not choose the solution.

    If they choose to charge by service time, how much per minute would be appropriate? Streaming media service usually consumes twice bandwidth as much as video call does. Nevertheless, I suggest its fee rate be set similar to, or even lower than that of general voice calls. As streaming media service is delivered through IP-based packet-switched network, it could use network resources more effectively than video phone, allowing larger bandwidth for users.

    That billing model encourages the use of streaming media to improve the efficiency of the network resources of operators. A challenge for operators is that they have to collect payments for content providers, which would increase the total cost of users. However, that seems to be a problem without solution, because content providers need to be paid, too.

    [+] WAP monthly package and the pricing for mobile Internet access

    In my view, WAP, the service that has been available since the 2G time is more profitable than mobile TV, which is wildly betted on because of the Olympic Games. Some operators have already offered WAP monthly packages without traffic volume limit. With the advent of 3G, they now face a problem: whether to raise or lower the package rates?

    As the costs of operators are based on traffic volumes and 3G, with higher speed, will generate far larger WAP volumes than 2G, maintaining the monthly packages does not seem to be a good deal. However, in order to encourage 3G subscribers to use WAP services, it makes no sense to raise the price. But operators do not want to cut price. Eventually, the fee rates are usually kept at the same level of the 2G services.

    As to the monthly mobile Internet access packages (via computers) for current China Unicom's CDMA network, no substantial change is expected because the speed of 3G service remains low (384k for WCDMA). However, as 3G has just been launched in mainland China, it would be well equivalent to the level of 3.5G (HSDPA) right from the beginning. As a result, the fee charging model would change.

    For example, there might be packages of RMB X/month for the speed of 128k and RMB Y/month for 256k. Such a pricing model is similar to that of ADSL. Theoretically, the peak rate of HSDPA could be up to 14.4M (it is reported that 3.6M Internet access services would be available soon in Taiwan). Therefore, it is possible to introduce different fee rates for different speed.

    [+] The fee rate of value-added services is not the key to attract subscribers

    Why operators are so reluctant to cut fee rates of 3G value-added services? Because in the fight for subscribers, they have already cut prices of general voice calls. How do they compensate the loss? Through the above value-added services, of course. Will the value-added service fee rate level affect their subscriber base? Basically not. Then why not setting the fee rates a little bit higher?

    Many consumers would consider switching to operators who offer lower voice rates, not the one who offer lower value-added service fee rates. The pricing of value-added service is not the key for operators to attract subscribers. With this user experience and such a mindset of operators, 3G value-added services will be cheap, but not so cheap as you have expected. ( 2008/07/27 - By Digitalwall.com - Way to China Internet/Telecom )

    - Read More


    Prev : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (6) Insight into 3G Price War in Taiwan

    Next : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (8) WAP Sector Is Slowing Down


    - Today in History


    New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (7) The Pricing of 3G Value-added Services
    - 2008/07/27


    New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (6) Insight into 3G Price War in Taiwan
    - 2008/07/20


    From Idea to Business (2) How to Estimate Your Income and Cost?
    - 2007/07/22


    New Era of Online Advertising (2) from Exposure to Deal
    - 2006/07/23


    Ultimate Mobile Device (5) Universal User Experience
    - 2005/07/24

  • New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (6) Insight into 3G Price War in Taiwan

    Operators always seek to avoid direct discount.

     

    [+] The 3G war in Taiwan started 5 years ago.


    In the previous sessions, I envisioned the post-restructuring 3G fee rate war in mainland China, and provided suggestions on the offensive and defensive strategies for operators. However, as those are just general discussions, it is hard for ordinary people to understand the remarkable aspects of the strategies. Now let's forget about New China Telecom, New China Mobile and New China Unicom, and take a look at the 3G price war that has been ongoing in Taiwan for 5 years.

    Taiwan is a place with a GSM penetration rate higher than 100%. In other words, it has more GSM phone numbers than its entire population. Thanks to white hot competitions in the market, the public has been well educated about the "on-net" and "off-net" fee rates. Calls between subscribers of the same operator are entitled to 50% off "on-net fee rates".

    Just take a look at the fee rate lists of operators in Taiwan, and you will see this is an inherent logic of their billing practice. As a result, the larger an operator is, the more powerful its ability to attract new and retain existing subscribers. The public knows that, for example, being a subscriber of Chunghwa Telecom, you have better chance of calling somebody who happens to be a subscriber of the same operator and being entitled to preferential (on-net) fee rates.

    At the beginning, emerging operators were not able to take a bite from the existing subscriber bases of the "Big 3", i.e., Chunghwa Telecom, Far Eastone Telecom and Taiwan Mobile. The first attack was launched by Taiwan's first 3G operator: Asia Pacific Broadband Wireless Communications Inc. (APBW) In July 2003, APBW launched its value-added brand QMA and two expensive 3G handset models, believing that the first 3G subscribers would arrive soon for its rich portfolio of applications.

    [+] Free calls for on-net subscribers

    It was not long before APBW found that its 3G vision was a beautiful mistake. Unable to achieve its sales target with expensive handsets and value-added services, the operator soon started its phase-II operation. With free handsets and a stunning offer of "free calls between on-net subscribers", it triggered a price war. Free on-net calls meant that calls between any two 3G subscribers of APBW were free of charge.

    The bloody price war did not trap the Big 3, which, as public companies, could not stand the consequent ugly finance statements. In addition, with strong brands, they did not feel the need of an immediate response. Many lovers and students joined the subscriber base of APBW in couple for the free on-net calls. They turned out to be the first subscribers of APBW.

    The Big 3 seemed to be so confident that they waited until the end of 2005 to launch their own 3G services. Their strategies were simple: just regarding 3G as a value-added service of 2G. They offered similar fee rates for 3G, except for the mobile Internet service. Up until then, there had not been an all-out 3G price war, as existing operators had been defensive, instead of offensive in the 3G market.

    In December 2005, a new 3G operator, VIBO Telecom launched its business operation. Like APBW, VIBO Telecom tried to build its subscribe base from scratch. With lessons learned from APBW, VIBO Telecom did not expect too much from value-added 3G services. Instead, it posed for a price war right from the beginning by offering a package "Everybody On-net".

    [+] Same fee rates for on-net and off-net calls

    "Everybody On-net" was just the opposite of free on-net calls. The following are a few examples of the differences:

    General 3G: NTD X/second for off-net calls and NTD 0.5X/second for on-net calls (like the case of 2G);

    APBW: NTD X/second for off-net calls, free of charge for on-net calls

    VIBO Telecom: NTD 0.5X/second for off-net calls, NTD 0.5X/second for on-net calls (the same price for on-net and off-net calls, "uniform rates")

    As mobile subscribers in Taiwan tended to believe that using services of major operators means better chance of enjoying the 50% discount on-net rates, "Everybody On-net" was actually an attempt to tell consumers that, with VIBO Telecom, they could have 50% discount rates for both on-net and off-net calls. As a matter of fact, VIBO Telecom's price war was to offer 50% discount for off-net fee rates.

    "Everybody On-net" led to the counterattack from the Big 3. The first to respond was Taiwan Mobile, which offered a "Local Life" package, dividing Taiwan into 5 regions. Calls within each region were entitled to uniform fee rates similar to those of VIBO Telecom. However, out of the selected region, the cost of communication would rise sharply.

    It was really a smart action. It squeezed VIBO Telecom out of the spot light of "uniform rates" without too much compromise in actual fee rates. The region-specific preferential rate package was not as lethal as the 50% discount of VIBO Telecom. However, the strong brand of Taiwan Mobile helped to prevent its subscribers from switching to VIBO Telecom.

    [+] Big brands sat tight

    For Taiwan Mobile, it was a successful defense. For APBW, however, it was an alert. It followed suit immediately by launching the brand new "Wonder 4" package, ,which, like that of Taiwan Mobile, divided Taiwan into just 4 regions, and offered lower rates than "Local Life". In this package, on-net calls were no longer free. It gave APBW a chance to get rid of the double-edged sword of free on-net calls.

    By far the 3G price war really begun, only Far Eastone Telecom and Chunghwa Telecom still sat tight. Instead of introducing new 3G packages, Far Eastone Telecom offered "get one free minute for each minute of on-net calls" promotion for the its existing package. In other words, it was another 50% off based on the existing 50% discount rate.

    Far Eastone Telecom promotion: NTD X/second for off-net calls, NTD 0.25X/second (roughly) for on-net calls.

    In face of deep cuts in off-net fee rates by rivals, Far Eastone Telecom chose to increase discount for its on-net rates to consolidate its subscriber base. Chunghwa Telecom launched an intensive TV advertisement campaign for its F2 (Friend and Family) package, which offered ultra-low rates for calls between each group of 10 mobile subscribers and 6 local fixed line subscribers. Leveraging its advantages in the local phone market, Chunghwa Telecom consolidated its subscriber base, while responding to the 3G price war in a roundabout way.

    It is not until lately that Chunghwa Telecom eventually joins the price war by introducing "uniform fee rates for on-net and off-net calls". Yet it has been 3 years since VIBO Telecom triggered the price war, it is true that market leaders are hurt by the proposition of VIBO Telecom. However, with strong brands, they can afford to be the last ones to join the price war.

    [+] Being cheap is just an excuse

    Aren't we talking about 3G? How comes that price war takes the place of value-added services as the prime role? As I have said, regarding value-added services as the prime role of 3G is a beautiful mistake. The fact is value-added services are only an excuse for operators to avoid price wars. Whether in Taiwan or in mainland China, 3G price wars are inevitable, so long as price killers exist in the market.

    In addition, operators are always seeking ways to avoid direct discounts. For them, the best solution is to make consumers feel an offering is cheap, which is actually not. "Being cheap is just an excuse". This is what I have learned from my experience in designing the "Everybody On-net" package at VIBO Telecom and the consequent price war. Consumers will never know the real planning of the operators behind the fee rates. ( 2008/07/20 - By Digitalwall.com - Way to China Internet/Telecom )

    - Read More


    Prev : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (5) Fee Rates of 3G Services

    Next : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (7) The Pricing of 3G Value-added Services

    - Today in History



    New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (7) The Pricing of 3G Value-added Services
    - 2008/07/27


    New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (6) Insight into 3G Price War in Taiwan
    - 2008/07/20


    From Idea to Business (2) How to Estimate Your Income and Cost?
    - 2007/07/22


    New Era of Online advertisement (2) from Exposure to Deal
    - 2006/07/23


    Ultimate Mobile Device (5) Universal User Experience
    - 2005/07/24

  • New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (5) Fee Rates of 3G Services

    The key of the attack and defense between operators is the fee rate.

     

    [+] Fee rates reflect the mindsets of operators


    Telecom services are basic services. The prime goods involved are "fee rates" (and "terminals" too). Selling communication services is like selling bottled water. It is difficult to target at the right market segment. Why do consumers have brand preference even when they cannot tell the difference between the tastes of bottled water? Since any operator can ensure uninterrupted communication, why do consumers prefer specific brands?

    Players offering homogeneous products would be trapped into an endless price war, which would eventually erode the profit margin of everybody, if they do not differentiate their brands and fee rates. So far, few researches on the telecom restructuring mention the price competition strategy. Fortunately, I have the experience of working at a 3G mobile operator as the one in charge of service package pricing. Therefore, I do have something to share with my readers.

    The first challenge in the post-restructuring 3G market is to attract subscribers of others while ensuring successful migration of the existing customer base. The key is the fee rate. As is shown in the following chart, operators adopting strategy D tend to have strong brands. Therefore, their 3G fee rates would be at the same level of 2G and no discount is expected.

    Such operators would choose to gradually migrate their 2G subscribers to the 3G network. With the same voice fee rates for both 3G and 2G services, the migration will not reduce their revenue. However, why should consumers switch to 3G if there's no discount? Do you really believe that the "rich portfolio of value-added 3G services" is the cause?

    [+] No price cut v.s. deep price cut

    In fact, only a small number of people would switch to 3G for value-added services. For the vast majority, they neither know nor care about what 3G is. But they will consider anything "that's cheaper". "Price cut" is capable of boosting sales without having to explain to the customer what 3G is.

    Operators adopting strategy D have enough confidence that their subscribers will not betray them for lower rates. Therefore, they are patient enough to sell 3G as value-added services of 2G. Nevertheless, they will need to give the subscribers something real. So they begin to cut the prices for mobile Internet services deeply to cater for those who have switched to 3G really for value-added services.

    It seems that only New China Mobile has the ability to adopt such a strategy. However, New China Unicom and New China Telecom are waiting to launch a price war. For them, strategy B is milder and worth trying. However, the real price killer is strategy A. Low 3G rate packages plus simple, affordable handsets, seem to be ready to sweep across the market.

    Anyone who triggers a price war would get hurt, too. At least with its own 2G subscribers flooding into 3G, its revenue would decrease. However, with its CDMA, New China Telecom doesn't have to worry, for its existing PHS service is cheap enough. If New China Telecom's 3G fee rates could be as low as that of PHS, it would be powerful enough to drive all rivals out of the market.

    [+] Ways to cut price

    Direct discount, e.g., the offering of a 3G rate based on the discount of a 2G rate, is the least desirable way for a price cut. Powerful as it is, there's no tactics to say. Imagine this: how about 50% off for calls between 3G users of New China Unicom? As communication between subscribers of the same operator consumes only internal resources and does not involve settlement with other operators. This would be a useful and low-cost way.

    It would enable New China Unicom to maintain 2G fee rates for 3G services, while offering 50% off for communication between its 3G subscribers. In addition, it would attract consumers in couples or in groups. For example, lovers or family members would switch to the service together to benefit from the 50% off discount. It enables operators to build up their customer bases fast.

    You might want to ask: "aren't lovers' or family packages very common in today's market?" The fact is most packages available in the market require the payment of an additional fee monthly. What I mean, however, is automatic availability without the need to pay for an additional package. The practice, which offers different fee rates for "on-net" and "off-net" calls and favorable rates for the former, has been popular around the world for years. But it has never appeared in China. For example:

    A 2G subscriber of New China Unicom calls a 2G subscriber of New China Mobile (off-net): RMB X/second;

    A 2G subscriber of New China Unicom calls a 3G subscriber of New China Mobile (off-net): RMB X/second;

    A 3G subscriber of New China Unicom calls a 2G subscriber of New China Mobile (off-net): RMB X/second;

    A 3G subscriber of New China Unicom calls a 3G subscriber of New China Mobile (off-net): RMB X/second;

    A 3G subscriber of New China Unicom calls another 3G subscriber of New China Unicom (on-net): RMB 0.5X/second;

    A 3G subscriber of New China Unicom calls a 2G subscriber of New China Unicom (on-net): RMB 0.5X/second;

    The above fee rates would have a number of results. 1) It would attract groups of subscribers of other operators to use the 3G services of New China Unicom to benefit from its favorable rates; 2) existing 2G subscribers of New China Unicom will speed up their migration to 3G for the favorable rates, without causing substantial loss to the revenue of the operator. In fact, if it is New China Mobile that adopts the above practice, the result would be even more stunning, as it has a formidable customer base. The problem is New China Mobile might think it is an unnecessary act.

    Maybe you would ask: "why 50% off instead of 20% off?" Mainly because 50% off is more impressive.

    What if New China Unicom and New China Telecom both use the same weapon? How would New China Mobile respond? It could simply offer 50% off for calls between its 3G and 2G subscribers, while maintaining the rates for other services. It would enable faster migration of existing 2G subscribers to 3G, and allow the operator to respond calmly to the price war waged by rivals. ( 2008/07/13 - By Digitalwall.com - Way to China Internet/Telecom )

    - Read More

    Prev : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (4) Dealing with Existing Subscribers is Key

    Next : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (6) Insight into 3G Price War in Taiwan

    - Today in History


    New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (5) Fee Rates of 3G Services
    - 2008/07/13


    From Idea to Business (1) How to Estimate Your User Number?
    - 2007/07/15


    New Era of Online Advertising (1) from Media to Channels
    - 2006/07/16


    Ultimate Mobile Device (4) Email Service Anywhere Anytime
    - 2005/07/10

  • New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (4) Dealing with Existing Subscribers is Key

    As a matter of fact, each of these operators has more than 100 million subscribers to deal with.

     

    [+] Are there bystanders in the 3G market?


    One interesting question: is it possible that, having obtained their 3G licenses, the 3 new operators, i.e., New China Mobile, New China Telecom and New China Unicom all choose to postpone the launch of their 3G services, and wait for the response of the market? After all, migrating existing GSM or CDMA or PHS subscribers to 3G proves to be a huge workload, and might trigger a price war if not dealt properly.

    In April 2007, I analyzed 4 possible market accessing strategies of 3G operators with a chart titled "Market Strategies of 3G Operators". As a matter of fact, each of these 4 strategies has been used by telecom operators around the world. Which is the best depends on the competition situation among local telecom operators, as well as standards they adopt.

    Most operators planning to postpone the launch of 3G services would adopt strategy C, i.e., starting by providing internet access service only. With base stations mostly located in cities, these operators primarily sell PC data cards to business people to enable Internet accessing for notebooks.In suburb regions, where 3G signal is not available, services will automatically roam to the original GSM network. So the operators will not provide 3G mobile phone and voice services in the initial stage.

    Operators adopting this strategy have a number of common identities: 1) they are market leaders with strong brands, and not afraid of rival operators trying to snap market shares away from them with 3G services. 2) Their 3G infrastructure development tends to be slow, with signals capable of covering only urban areas at the beginning. Business people do have requirements for mobile internet, but they care even more about the quality of voice communication. Therefore, the limit signal coverage for the voice service in the initial stage would offend them.

    [+] Maybe everybody is a bystander

    The one that's most likely to adopt the above tactics is New China Mobile. In view of the heavy workload of migrating hundreds of millions of subscribers to TD-SCDMA, and the possibility of revenue decline, it pays to be careful. Anyway, nobody has experience in TD-SCDMA. With confidence in the brand, many subscribers would rather wait for New China Mobile's 3G services than switch to other operators.

    Therefore, New China Mobile might well be a bystander at the initial stage. Although 3G is a more advanced technology, it is hard for ordinary consumers to tell the difference from 2G (I have a 3G phone myself, but I use it only to make phone calls and send/receive short messages). Therefore, it would be hard to persuade them to switch to 3G in the initial stage.

    Should other operators take the advantage of the time window in the 3G voice market left by New China Mobile to introduce their own services? Should they launch attacks with 3G systems and infrastructures that are more mature and easier to deploy, as well as 3G handsets and more affordable fee rates? Or should they join New China Mobile to adopt strategy C and be a bystander in the initial stage too?

    There's one factor they must consider when selecting their competition strategies: where will their 3G subscribers come from? In our view, the 3G subscribers will come from: 1) their own 2G customer base; 2) the 2G customer bases of other operators; and 3) people who have never used a handset. The experience of 3G operators in Japan indicates that, for any 3G operator, most of the 3G subscribers would come from its own 2G customer base, with only a small portion from rival operators.

    [+] The speed and the fee rates are the key

    If operators do intend to migrate their 2G customer bases to 3G, there would be a peaceful market in the initial stage. As each operator is engaged in migrating its own 2G subscribers to 3G, no one would bother to launch an attack before it has had a strong foothold in the market.

    As a matter of fact, each of these operators has more than 100 million subscribers to deal with. The one who completes all this first would take the lead in launching an attack. Therefore, the key to success would be speed, nothing else. Despite the strong brand of New China Mobile, which allows it the luxury of more waiting time, subscribers are realistic and impatient. They would switch to any other operator that offers the most favorable terms.

    To retain existing subscribes and launch an attack toward other operators, the fee rate packages for voice services would be a powerful weapon. The advent of 3G has led to the emergence of a number of call modes: including 3G-to-3G and 3G-to-2G. As there are 3 different systems for both 3G and 2G, the situation could become more complicated. For example, a 3G subscriber of New China Telecom would call a 2G subscriber of New China Unicom.

    With such a complexity, a compelling fee rate package would be helpful to retain and migrate existing subscribers while attracting new subscribers from other operators. As to whether it would reduce the revenue of the operator, there's no guarantee. Anyway, 3G is not something intended to help operators earn more. ( 2008/07/06 - By Digitalwall.com - Way to China Internet/Telecom )

    - Read More


    Prev : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (3) Who's Gonna Be the Price Killer?

    Next : New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (5) Fee Rates of 3G Services

    - Today in History


    New Landscape in China's Telecom Market (4) Dealing with Existing Subscribers is Key
    - 2008/07/06


    Ultimate Mobile Device (3) Video, Storage, Copyright Management
    - 2005/07/03

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